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In a phased mission the relevant system configuration (block
diagram or fault tree) changes during consecutive time periods
(phases). Many systems are required to perform phased missions; a
classic example is a spacecraft.
The reliability analysis of a phased mission encounters complexi-
ties not present with just one phase, but can be transformed into an
analysis of an equivalent synthetic single-phase system. The trans-
formation has a potential for direct application, but can also be used
to study refined computational methods and to derive approximations
to, and bounds on, mission reliability.
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1. INTRODUCTION
1 . 1 BACKGROUND
Among the various areas of applied probability theory and statis-
tics which jointly have become known as reliability theory, structural
reliability is the study of qualitative and quantitative relationships
between the reliability of (redundant) systems and the reliability of
their components. Reliability in the sense used here is the "probabi-
lity of a device performing its purpose adequately for the period of
2
time intended and the operating conditions encountered."
The problem of constructing reliable systems by using relatively
unreliable components redundantly was first studied by von Neumann
I 1956J , Moore and Shannon [1956], inspired by the von Neumann paper,
analyzed relay circuits in which all relays have the same reliability.
They proved that the reliability of the circuit is an S-shaped function
of the common relay reliability, and subsequently showed that by pro-
per incorporation of redundancy, arbitrarily reliable circuits can be
constructed from arbitrarily unreliable elements. Their analysis pro-
ceeded from a mathematical result which has come to be called the
"Moore-Shannon inequality." Birnbaum, Esary, and Saunders [1961]
generalized the concepts and extended some of the results of lioore
and Shannon, including the S-shapedness property, ito the large class
3
of "coherent" systems, using Boolean functions to describe the func-
4
tional organization of systems. Esary and Proschran [1963] further
extended the Moore-Shannon inequality to the case <x>f unequal component
reliabilities, and obtained convenient upper and lioower bounds on

system reliability. With the subsequent introduction of the con-
cept of "system life" [Esary and Marshall 1964], a theoretical basis
for the reliability analysis of complex systems was complete.
Recent and ongoing research seems to follow mainly two lines. On
one hand, the theoretical basis is broadened, more realistic and hence
more complex situations are considered, and attempts to do without
some of the restrictive assumptions presently required are made. On
the other hand, approximation techniques and computational procedures
are explored with a view toward their implementation on digital com-
puters.
One specialized area of interest is the extension of the basic
problem of structural reliability to the situation in which the func-
tional organization of a system changes with time. This situation,
called the phased mission problem, is the topic of this thesis.
1.2 THE PHASED MISSION PROBLEM
The reliability analysis of phased missions has received attention
in the basic papers of Rubin [1964] and Weisberg and Schmidt [1966]
which present procedures to approximately predict mission reliability
and crew safety for manned spacecraft. These authors introduced a
Q
method of "cut cancellation" which can be advantageously used to
simplify the structure of a system prior to beginning reliability
calculations. More recently, a similar approach is described in the
United States Navy reliability manual NAVORD OD 29304 Revision A
9[1973], Muth [1964], in an unpublished report, approached the
problem from a different angle, concentrating on "success paths."

The phased mission problem as considered here refers to the
following situation:
A system consists of several components . The components perform
independently of each other, and each of them can be in one of
two states, functioning or failed . No component can be repaired
or replaced, and each component has a_ life . The system performs
a mission which can be divided into consecutive time periods, or
phases . During each phase it has to accomplish a specified task.
Thus the system configuration (a subset of the components and their
functional organization which can be represented, for instance, by
a block diagram or a fault tree) changes from phase to phase. As
is the case with individual components, only two states of the
system are recognized, functioning or failed.
With this situation in mind, the problem itself can be stated as:
Given the survival characteristics of the components, the rele-
vant system configuration in each phase, and the duration of the
. phases, what is the probability that the system will function
throughout the mission, i.e. the mission reliability for the
system?
The classic example of a phased mission is the voyage of a space
12
vehicle, but many other systems * are also required to perform phased
missions. To illustrate the ideas and methods of this thesis, the
13following hypothetical situation will frequently be considered.
Example 1.1 . A fire department has three vehicles:
- a multipurpose fire engine (M)
,
- a tanker (T)
,




The firefighting equipment of a small chemical factory located
nearby consists of:
- a sprinkler system (S)
,
- a hydrant (H)
,
- a special apparatus for fighting chemical fires (F)
.
The plant safety engineer wonders whether the combined hardware
resources of the fire department and the factory are sufficient to
fight a fire in the factory. He consults the fire chief, and together
they conclude:
(1) During the initial stage of a fire either the multipurpose
engine, which carries a small water supply, or the light truck, pro-
vided the sprinkler system works, suffices to evacuate the building.
(2) To contain the fire the factory's special apparatus is
needed, together with some auxiliary capability from the multipurpose
engine or the light truck. Water can be supplied to the special
apparatus and the department's units by the hydrant, or if it is out
of order, by the tanker through pumps in the multipurpose engine.
(3) After the fire has been contained it can be controlled
either by the special apparatus or the multipurpose engine. Again,
water can be supplied by the hydrant or by the tanker together with
the multipurpose engine.
The firefighting system described above has six components, and
it has to perform a three-phased mission. If it fails in even one
of the three phases, the mission is not accomplished.
1.3 SOME COMPLEXITIES OF THE PHASED MISSION PROBLEM
The reliability analysis of a phased mission encounters some
complexities which are not present when only one phase is considered.
11

For one thing, it is not correct to do a standard reliability
analysis for each phase separately, and then multiply the resulting
phase reliabilities together, even if the age of the components at
the beginning of each phase is taken into account. The implicit
assumption involved, that each component is functioning at the begin-
ning of a phase when the system has functioned throughout the previous
phase, is not necessarily true. The following example illustrates
this point.
Example 1.2 . A system with two independent components, C.
and C~, is designed for a two-phased mission. In order for the
system to perform the required tasks, at least one component has to
function through phase 1 and both components have to function through
phase 2. The block diagram for this system is
^L
%
phase I phase 2
For k=l,2, let ir , . denote the probability that component C,
functions through phase 1, and tt „ denote the conditional proba-
bility that component C, functions through phase 2, given that it
has functioned through phase 1. The system reliability for phase 1
is it. = ir-
1
+ tt - it tt , and the system reliability for phase
2, given that both the components have functioned through phase 1,





















This is greater than the correct mission reliability, which is
p =
^11^12^21^22
since mission success is achieved if, and only if, both components
function throughout both phases. Q
The multi-phase case is potentially different from the single-
phase case in another respect. With just one phase, if each component
has a life and the system configuration is coherent, then the system
14has a life. In the multi-phase case this is not necessarily true.
Even if all components have lives and all phase configurations are
coherent, the system may not have a life. How this can happen is
shown in the next example.
Example 1.3 . A two-component system is designed for a two-phase




phase I phase 2
If \-» k=l,2, j=l,2 are defined as in Example 1.2, then there is




tt^- that the system fails in phase 1, but
functions again in phase 2. In this sense the system does not have
a life. D
The possible resurrection of a system in a later phase does not
present a problem in the reliability analysis of phased missions if
13

it is assumed that the life of the system ends at the time of its
first failure. This assumption is reasonable since failure of the
system in even one phase usually prevents mission success, and will
always be made here. By contrast, the possible resurrection of a
component would pose a much more serious problem, and is ruled out by
the assumption that all components have lives,
1.4 NON-ANALYTIC WAYS TO EVALUATE PHASED MISSIONS
Traditionally, the reliability of complex systems performing
multi-phased missions has been estimated by Monte Carlo methods. For
large systems, however, mission simulation and determination of success
or failure are time-consuming even when digital computers are employed.
Furthermore, Monte Carlo methods require a great number of simulation
replications before high confidence limits can be placed on a narrow
reliability band. It is therefore not surprising that these methods
proved to be excessively expensive in terms of both, time and money,
especially when parametric studies must be performed.
Another method of analyzing phased missions is by considering the
distinct combinations of component performances which lead to mission
success, i.e. the success paths .. To see how this works, assume that
the system has n components C.,...,C
,
and is designed for an
1 n
m-phased mission. Let I be the maximum number of phases component
C, survives, i =0,1, , .
.
,m, k=l,...,n. Each of the n-tuples
(£.,..,,£ ) then represents an event which implies either mission
success or failure, depending on the functional organization of the
system in the m phases. The probabilities of the events can be com-
puted from the component survival characteristics. Since the events •
14

are disjoint, the probability of mission success, i.e. the relia-
bility of the system for the mission, is the sum of the probabilities
of the success path events.
This method is straightforward and could easily be developed into
an algorithm for computer implementation. In addition, it has the
advantage that with a slight modification not only the mission relia-
bility but also the probability of the system to survive the first j
phases of its mission, j=l,...,m, can be obtained. However, the
number of n-tuples to be considered, (m+1)
,
is such that economic
reasons prevent its use even for moderately sized systems performing
only a few phases.
A refined computational method based on success paths was developed
by Muth [1964] . His approach consists of setting up phase matrices of
components and success paths, and collapsing these matrices successively
into a single matrix which represents system success at the end of phase
j, j=l,.».,m. If the system can be broken up into many small sub-
systems which have no components in common and thus can be analyzed
separately, this approach makes reliability computations feasible.
1.5 CONTENTS AND SUMMARY
In this thesis, the phased mission problem is approached analytic-
ally. The verbal statement of the problem in Section 1.2 is translated
into mathematical terms in Chapter 2. The resulting model is an equa-
tion which relates mission reliability to the survival characteristics
of the components, the phase durations, and the phase configurations.
However, this equation, i.e. 2.3.1, neither provides much insight into
the problem nor can it easily be used to obtain numerical results.
15

In Chapter 3 a transformation is exhibited by means of which
a multi-phase mission can be reduced to an equivalent synthetic
single-phase system. Direct applications of this transformation are
discussed in Chapter A. They include a method to adapt existing
algorithms and computer programs to the calculation of exact mission
reliabilities, and a technique to simplify phased mission problems
prior to beginning reliability calculations.
A troublesome byproduct of the transformation is an apparent
increase in the number of components of the system to which it is
applied. This may aggravate computational problems and make the cal-
culation of the exact mission reliability infeasible. Consequently,
it may be necessary to resort to approaches which require less com-
putational effort. Chapter 5, therefore, is devoted to a study of
bounds on mission reliability. Several upper and lower bounds are
derived and compared with each other, both in terms of precision and
the amount of computational effort required, and an algorithm for the
"best" lower bound is presented, ^--An approximation technique which
has successfully been applied to single-phase systems is based on the
approximate hazard transform of Esary and Hayne [1973] ; its potential
for the phased mission problem is discussed in Chapter 6.
Finally, possible extensions of the methods presented in this





2. MATHEMATICAL FORMULATION OF THE PHASED MISSION PROBLEM
The starting point of an analysis of the phased mission problem
described in Section 1.2 is a mathematical model which quantitatively
relates the variables of interest (the survival characteristics of the
components, the functional organization of these components in the
various phases of the mission, and the duration of the phases) to
mission reliability. Such a model is developed here in three steps.
The analytic tools employed are extensions of those used in standard
reliability analysis. The underlying assumptions are made explicit.
2.1 A MODEL FOR COMPONENT PERFORMANCES
The system under consideration is assumed to have n components,
labelled C, ,...,C . Each component C has a life, and hence its
time to failure, or life length, is well defined. Since it depends
on many factors and cannot be predicted accurately, it is expressed
17 18
by a non-negative random variable T . The assumption that the
components perform independently of each other formally means that
T.,...,T are stochastically independent.
For each component C and all times t>0, let X, (t) be a
Bernoulli random variable defined by




The random variable X^(t) is called a performance state indicator
variable
,
and the stochastic process {X, (t),t>0} is the performance
process of the component C, . Since each component has a life, this






(t) = <==> X^s) = 0, s > t.
b) xk (t)
= 1 <==> X^s) = 1, < s <; t,
Thus a sample path of a performance process is non-increasing and








Figure 2.1. Performance process sample
path, component C, .
For each t>0, let X(t) = (X (t) X (t)) be the performance
state indicator vector of the set of components. Then the stochastic
process {X(t),t>0} is called the joint performance process of the
components.
The joint performance process is a mathematical description of the
component failure times, and as such the first step in the development
of the model. It is compatible with the use of structure functions
to represent system configuration within the phases, which is discussed
in the next section.
2.2 A MODEL FOR SYSTEM CONFIGURATIONS
It is assumed throughout this thesis that the state of the system
(i.e. functioning or failed) is completely determined by the states of
18

19its components. Then the system configuration in each of the
20 21
phases can be described by a block diagram or a fault tree for
conceptual purposes, or by a structure function for mathematical
analysis. A structure function is a binary function
<J>
of binary
variables x..,...,x which relates the performance state of the
system to the performance states of its components; in particular
<£ (x) = <j> (x. , . . . ,x ) = 1 if the system functions, and <t>(x) =
otherwise, where x, = 1 if component C, functions, and x, =
otherwise.
It is further assumed that each phase configuration of a system
22
is coherent , i.e. can be represented by a block diagram or a fault
tree using AND and OR gates. If a configuration is coherent, then
23
its structure function ()> has the properties:
a) $ (x) > <j) (y) whenever x > y , k=l,...,n.
(2.2.1) b) <j)(0) = <(»C0 0) = 0.
c) Ml) = <K1,...,D = 1.
To illustrate, a block diagram for the mission described in
































The structure functions for the system of Example 1.1 are:
for phase 1, ^ = 3^ v XjJtg,
for phase 2,
<f> 2
= XpC^C^ v xL ) v x^),
for phase 3, 4> 3
= x^ v ^(x.j, v x
H) .






1 if x = 1 or x = 1,
if x = and x = 0,
or for computational purposes, x.. v x = x.. + x„ - x.x„ =
1 - (1-X]L ) (l-x2 ) .
The phase structure functions can be combined with the joint per-
formance process to achieve a concise mathematical formulation of the
phased mission problem.
2.3 A COMPLETE MODEL FOR THE PHASED MISSION PROBLEM
The mission is assumed to be divided into m phases, and to
start at time t=0. For j=l,...,m, the time at which phase j ends
and, except for j=m, the next phase begins, is denoted by t.. The
structure function appropriate for phase j is denoted by $ .
.
The event that the system functions during phase j can be
expressed as {<(> . (X(t . ) )=1} , and the event that the system functions
throughout the m phases, i.e.
v
throughout the mission, as
{<}>.. (X(t 1 ))=l, . . .,<() (X(t ))=1}. The mission reliability for the system
J. ~ l m ~ m —— *-
is the probability that this event occurs. Since <J).(X(t.)), j=l,...,m,




(2.3.D P = piTTj.1 ^(xc^))^] = e TTj^+jCxctj)),
where E denotes expectation.
Equation (2.3.1) is the complete model for the phased mission
problem as described in the introduction and as qualified by the
assumptions made, but neither is it a formula for practical reliability
calculations nor does it provide much insight into the problem. It
does, however, indicate that the sequential operation of the phase
configurations to some extent resemble the operation of subsystems




3. TRANSFORMATION OF THE PHASED MISSION PROBLEM
Complexities in the reliability analysis of phased missions arise
because a component's performance in one phase is not stochastically
independent of its performance in any other phase. The dependence,
however, is of a special type. A component functions in phase j if,
and only if, it has previously functioned in phase 1, and in phase 2,
..., and in phase j-1, and then functions in phase j. This sequence
of requirements suggests that the performance of a component in phase
j can be represented by a series-like structure whose elements repre-
sent its performance in phases l,...,j.
3.1 THE TRANSFORMATION
Suppose that component C is replaced in phase j by a system
of components C, ,,..., C,
. ,
performing independently and in series.
In block diagram format, the block
-Ej-
is replaced in phase j by the system
-ED-E2---Q-
In fault tree format, the input event C, (failure of component C, )
is replaced in phase j by
23

Let U , ...,U, . be independent performance state indicator





P[Uki=l] = P[Xk (t i)=l|Xk (t._1 )=l], i=2,...j.
Then P[X




where = means "is stochastically equal to" or, less formally,
"has the same distribution as." Thus the original component and the
substituted system have, as of the end of phase j, the same
reliability.
The preceeding observations suggest that a transformation of the
phased mission problem can be accomplished by
a) Replacing, in the configuration for phase j, j=l,...,m,
component C,
,
k=l,...,n, by a series system in which the
components C, -,..., C, . perform independently, with the pro-
babilities of functioning given in (3.1.1).
b) Considering the transformed phase configurations to be sub-
systems which operate in series.
24

The resulting new system, which has (at most) n*m independent
components, is the equivalent system . As will be shown later, the
ordinary reliability of the equivalent system is the same as the
reliability of the original system for its phased mission.
The block diagram for the equivalent system arising out of Example
1.1 is given in Figure 3.1. A comparison with the block diagram for











t l ui lt)luhMUU
configuration 2








Figure 3.1. Equivalent system for the
mission of Example 1.1.
25

3.2 SOME PROPERTIES OF THE EQUIVALENT SYSTEM
Two important properties of the equivalent system are that it
performs just one phase, and that it is coherent. The former is a
direct consequence of step (b) of the transformation. To obtain the
latter, note that by step (b) of the transformation the equivalent
system is a series, and hence coherent, structure of subsystems which
themselves are coherent structures by assumption; their elements are,
from step (a) of the transformation, series systems of components.
The result then follows from the fact that a coherent structure of
24
coherent structures is coherent.
These two properties together with the assumption that all com-
ponents in the original system - and hence all components in the
equivalent system - have lives imply that the equivalent system has a
25
life. Thus the potential difficulties mentioned in the introduction
and illustrated in Example 1.3 cannot occur in the equivalent system.
By contrast, another one of the difficulties of phased missions
mentioned in the introduction does not disappear in the equivalent
system. Although the m phase configurations operating in sequence
in the phased mission become m subsystems operating in series in the
equivalent system - a fact which simplifies the problem considerably -
the subsystems usually have components in common and do not function
independently. Hence the product of the subsystem reliabilities is in
general not equal to the reliability of the equivalent system, as is
illustrated by the following extension of Example 1.2.
Example 3.1 . For the mission described in Example 1.2, the
















ubsy stem 1 subsystem 2
Letting tt
,
k=l,2, j=l,2, be as defined in Example 1.2, and
Pkl=7Tkl' P k2 =1Tkl
1T
k2' k=1 » 2 » the subsystem reliabilities are
P l " *!! + ^21 " 1I 11 1T21
=
p ll




ir21ir22 = P 12 P 22 .
Their product p 1 p 2 is, except in trivial cases, less than the true
system reliability p = *^12* 2\?22
= p 12 p 22 which can be found by
reducing the block diagram to its simplest form
II 21 22
The true reliability for the equivalent system does agree with the
reliability for the phased mission given in Example 1.2. Q
3.3 MATHEMATICAL FORMULATION OF THE TRANSFORMED PROBLEM
The transformed version of the phase j configuration functions
if the event {cf, (U (1)U (2)
. .
.U (j } )=1} occurs, where U (i) = (U , . . . ,U )
J ~ ~ ~ li' » ni '










u«>) - i,...,vW(1V 2 >. ..«.<->) . i)
occurs. Thus the reliability of the equivalent system is













'j=l T J ~
3.4 RELIABILITY EQUIVALENCE OF THE ORIGINAL AND THE EQUIVALENT SYSTEM
It remains to establish that the reliability of the equivalent
system agrees with the mission reliability of the original system, i.e.
that p as given by (3.3.1) agrees with p as given by (2.3.1). This
is done by the following theorem and the subsequent remarks.
Theorem 3.1 . Let X
,
. . .
,X be a non-increasing sequence of
Bernoulli random variables, i.e. X..>X >...>X . Let D......D be12 m I'm
independent Bernoulli random variables with
PD^-i] = PlXj-i],












U„ , . .
.
,U.U„ . . .U .1' 'm 112 12 m
Proof . It is only necessary to show for each non-increasing
binary sequence x.. >x„^. . .>x , x.=0 or 1, j=l, . .
.
,m, that
PIX,^.,...^ =x ] = P[U =x. ,U-U.=x ,...,U 1 U_...U =x ].11 mm 11' 12 2' ' 2 mm
For the sequence x,=0, x =0,...,x =0,12 m
P[X =0,...,X =0] = P[X =0] = P[U =0]
1 m 1 i
















PIV1 V11 =P[Xm=1 l Xm-r1] '"
...P[X
2
-1 13^=1] P[X X=1]


























= p[xi+1=o|x A=i] PtX^l,...^^]










From (2.1.1) the sequence of variables X^t^ , . . . ,Xfc (tm) , which
indicate the performance of component Ck at
the end of each phase,













ukrukluk2 ,...,ukluk2 ...ukm .
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Then, since component failure times, and consequently performance
processes, are independent,
l( t x ) ,x(t2 ) ....






a¥2) • • .»w •
Since the event "success in the phased mission" occurs if <)>.. (X(t.))=l,
j=l,...,m, and the event "functioning of the equivalent system" occurs
if 6 (U
(1)U (2) ...U (" ) )=1, 1=1 m, then these two events are
j ~
stochastically equivalent. Thus p as given by (2.3.1) agrees with
p as given by (3.3.1).
30

4. DIRECT APPLICATIONS OF THE TRANSFORMATION
The transformation described in Chapter 3 can be used to obtain
results for the phased mission problem which are of theoretical and
practical interest. Two of these are discussed below.
4.1 CALCULATION OF THE EXACT MISSION RELIABILITY
27
Several computational methods are known for the numerical
evaluation of system reliability in the single-phase case. Based on
28
them, computer programs for reliability analyses have been developed.
The transformation provides, in principle, a way to adapt these methods
and programs to the calculation of mission reliabilities in the multi-
phase case. The necessary inputs are the phase configurations and,
phase by phase, the conditional probabilities that the components sur-
vive the phase, given that they have survived the previous phases, i.e.














k=l,...,n. From (3.1.1) the conditional component phase reliabilities
are the reliabilities of the components in the equivalent system.
Computer programs could be adapted to accomplish steps (a) and (b) of
the transformation internally, and then to find the reliability of the
equivalent system which by Theorem 3.1 is the mission reliability for
the original system.
Theoretically, this approach eliminates all difficulties inherent
in the phased mission problem, because it reduces the reliability
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analysis of a system performing a multi-phase mission to the standard
reliability analysis of a single-phase system. It may, however, not
always be a practical or an efficient approach. Realistic systems
usually have so many components to start with that when the transfor-
mation is performed with its concomitant increase in the number of
components in the equivalent system, the costs - in terms of computer
time and memory - of calculating exact mission reliabilities are
excessive. Frequently this is the case even for single-phase missions.
Most existing reliability analysis programs therefore are designed to
provide only approximations to system reliability, and it is not
always clear whether such an approximation is conservative or optimistic.
Thus the direct approach, i.e. applying the transformation and then
using an existing computer program, is not necessarily the best solu-
tion to the phased mission problem.
Different approaches to the assessment of mission reliability which
avoid some of the problems mentioned above will be discussed in Chapters
5 and 6, after an additional direct application of the transformation
has been presented.
4.2 THE CUT CANCELLATION TECHNIQUE
The transformation can provide a simple rationale for the cut
cancellation technique of Rubin, Weisberg, and Schmidt. Conversely,
cut cancellation can result in an advantageous simplification of the
earlier configurations of a phased mission, prior to any implementation
of the transformation.
For instance, the sequence of phase configurations in Example 1.2
turned out to have the mission reliability p - tt tt ^tt^i 1T ?? * Using
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notation introduced in Example 3.1, i.e. defining the (unconditional)
component reliability p . as the probability that component Ckj k.
survives from the beginning of the mission through the end of phase j,
(4.2.1) pkj = P[Xk (t.)=l] = TTiix^. 3=1. ,m,
k=l,...,n, this mission reliability can be written as p = pp.
The sequence of phase configurations
-^5H^
phase I phase 2
has the same mission reliability. In Example 1.2 the only minimal
cut set in phase i, {C.,C„}, contains the phase 2 cut sets {C, }
and {C_}. Thus {C.,C_} can be "cancelled" in its phase, leaving
a configuration which can never fail.
The minimal cut sets of a (coherent) system are the minimal (in
the sense of set inclusion) combinations of components which by all
failing cause the system to fail. Every coherent system can be viewed
as a series structure of subsystems, each of which consists of the
29
components in a minimal cut set acting in parallel. Equivalently,
the configuration of every coherent system - and, in the context of the
phased mission problem, every phase configuration - can be described
by a complete list of its minimal cut sets.
The rule for cut cancellation is:
A minimal cut set in a phase can be cancelled, i.e.
omitted from the list of minimal cut sets for that
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phase, if it contains a minimal cut set of a
later phase.
A slightly more typical illustration of how cut cancellation works
is given in the following example.







The minimal cut sets are: in phase 1 {C. } {C ,C„},





The phase 1 cut {C„,C„} contains the phase 2 cut {C_}, and so can
be cancelled in phase 1. No cancellation results from the fact that
the phase 2 cut {C. ,C„} contains the phase 1 cut {C. } because cut
cancellation is not a symmetric procedure.






It is easy to verify that both sequences lead to the same mission
reliability by comparing their equivalent systems. Q
The use of cut cancellation is justified by the theorem below.
In its proof, the symbol V is the repeated OR operator; for binary




,7 nV. n x. = x, v x„ v. . .v x ,k=l k 1 2 n'
or, for computational purposes,
v k=ixk = 1 -TTk=1 (1-V-
Theorem 4.1 . Cut cancellation does not affect mission reliability.
Proof . Assume without loss of generality that a system performing
a phased mission contains a minimal cut set {C......C ,C ,,,..., C }t- 1' ' r' r+1' ' s
in the configuration of phase h, and a minimal cut set {C, ,...,C }
in the configuration of phase i, i>h. From (3.3.1) the reliability
of the equivalent system is, in shorthand notation,
p = E d>, <b„ . . .d>, ...d)....d> .r T l T 2 Th x m
Let <j>, and <j> . denote the structure functions of the subsystems
that remain when the above minimal cut sets are omitted in the trans-














i i k=l '
'
j=l kj
The reliability can now be expressed as
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p = e * 1 * 2 ...V(vk:iTTj =1\j ) ---V (\=iTTj i 1\j )..-*m
- E ^ 2 ...*;...*^..c^=iTTj=1\j )cvkyTj i1\j ).









12 Th i Tnr
i.e. the minimal cut set can be omitted from the transformed configura-
tion of phase h without changing the reliability of the equivalent
30
system. The result then follows from Theorem 3.1. Q
Remark 4.2 . An even stronger result than Theorem 4.1 can be
achieved. If (as henceforth will be done) ti> . is used to denote the
J
structure function of the phase j configuration after cut cancellation
has been performed to the greatest possible extent, j=l,...,m, then
by an argument along the lines of the proof above it can be shown that
although it follows from (4.2.2) that for j=l,...,m,
(4.2.4) d>. > A.,
J J
and strict inequality may hold in (4.2.4) for all j except j=m. D
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As a final illustration of the cut cancellation
technique, con-
sider its effect on the mission described in
Example 1.1. The minimal
cut sets for this mission are, before cancellation:
in phase 1 {M,L} {M,S}
• in phase 2 {F} {H,M} {H,T} {M,U
in phase 3 {F,M} {H,M} {H,T}
The minimal cut sets remaining after cancellation
are:
in phase 1 (M,S>
in phase 2 (F> {M,L}
in phase 3 {F,M} {H,M} {H,T}
A block diagram for the sequence of simplified
phase configurations





Figure 4.1. Block diagram for the mission of
Example 1.1 after cut cancellation.
After cancellation, the transformation can be applied
to obtain
the equivalent system shown in Figure 4.2. This
system is considerably
simpler than the one shown in Figure 3.1, but has the
same reliability.







































, V H 3
transformed transformed
configuration I configuration 2
transformed
conf igurat ion 3
Figure 4.2. Equivalent system for the mission
of Example 1.1, after cancellation.
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5. BOUNDS ON MISSION RELIABILITY
In Section 4.1 it was shown how the transformation can be used
directly for the calculation of exact mission reliabilities; it was
also pointed out why this approach may be problematic. In this
chapter, bounds on mission reliability are studied. Bounds require
less computational effort than the exact reliabilities and, although
not necessarily precise, often suffice for the purpose at hand.
5.1 BOUNDS BASED ON PHASE RELIABILITY FUNCTIONS
A tempting procedure to approximate mission reliability is to
31deliberately commit what was shown to be a logical error when trying
to find exact reliabilities, namely to compute the reliability of each
phase configuration separately, and then to multiply the results
together. There are at least two choices of component reliabilities
to use in doing this: the conditional component phase reliabilities
ii,
.
given in (4.1.1), or the (unconditional) component reliabilities
p, . given in (4.2.1). The first choice leads to estimating mission
reliability by
(5.1.D tt^ = TTj^y^,...,^),
and the second choice to estimating mission reliability by
(5.1.2) PpRF = TTj!1hj (plj .....Pnj ),
where in both cases h., j=l,...,m, are the reliability functions for
32the phase configurations. The reliability function of a system with
structure function <{> is defined by
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where X ,...,X are independent performance state indicator variables
with P[X
k
=l] = pk , k=l,...,n.
The following theorem shows that (5.1.1) gives an optimistic
result (cf . Example 1.2), i.e. is an upper bound on mission reliability,
and that (5.1.2) gives a conservative result (cf. Example 3.1), i.e.
is a lower bound
.
Theorem 5.1. For ^nri -n as given by (5.1.1), p DDr as givenrRr rKr
by (5.1.2), and p as given by (2.3.1) or (3.3.1), ppRp
< p < 7rpRF .
Proof . The coherent phase configurations have non-decreasing












) -< e TTj^o^)
(5.1.3)
_ TT m / TT (j).TTjWu >
so that p ^ t ~ from (3.3.1) and (5.1.1).
PRr
33 34
The proof that p £ p uses standard properties of associatecT
random variables. Since U,
.
, k=l,...,n, j=l, . .
.
,m, are independent
and thus associated, and cj>
. ,
j=l,...,m, are non-decreasing, then
<}>
.
(U U ...U ), j=l,...,m, are associated. Therefore the inequality
J ~ ~ ~
holds, so that p_,__ < p from (3.3.1) and (5.1.2).
rKr
The method of approximating mission reliability described above
can also be employed after cut cancellation has been performed. Denoting



















gives an optimistic, and P pRF_cc a




^p^p..^ as given by (5.1.4), Pp^p_QC as
given by (5.1.5), and p as given by (2.3.1) or (3.3.1), PpRp_cc -
D ^ IT .V PRF-CC
Proof . The phase structure functions are greater after cut can-
cellation than before from (4.2.4); thus
so that p £ tt-dt,^ nn from (3.3.1), (5.1.3), and (5.1.4).
The
<f> ,
j=l,...,m are non-decreasing, and therefore the same
3fi





E4»T(u (1) u (2) ...u (j) ) < e n. m *T(u (1) u (2) ...u (j) ).
1
'3=1 j ~ ~ 'j=l J ~
The equivalent system has the same reliability before and after cut












...u^ ) ) >
so that PpRF_cc ^ P
from (3.3.1) and (5.1.5). D
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The four bounds presented so far all presuppose that the phase
reliability functions h or h are known for all m phases.
Although to compute them is considerably easier than to compute the
reliability function for the complete equivalent system, it may still
be a formidable task. In the following section, therefore, bounds
are studied which do not involve the phase reliability functions.
5.2 BOUNDS BASED ON PHASE BOUNDS
For coherent single-phase systems with independent components,
Esary and Proschan [1963] have established two bounds on system
reliability which can be computed without a knowledge of the reliability
function. In one case, the system is expressed as a series structure
of subsystems each of which consists of the components in a minimal
cut set acting in parallel. The reliabilities of all subsystems are
calculated separately and then multiplied together, the result being
the minimal cut lower bound . In the other case, the system is expressed
as a parallel structure of subsystems each of which consists of the
components in a minimal path set acting in series. Again, the subsystem
reliabilities are calculated separately, and then the reliability of
the system is computed as if the subsystems were independent, resulting
37
in the minimal path upper bound . (The minimal path sets of a coherent
system are the minimal, in the set inclusion sense, combinations of
components which by all functioning ensure the functioning of the system.)
These two bounds, when applied to each phase separately, can be
used to approximate mission reliability in the multi-phase case. Let
h..
R .
and hr R - denote the minimal path upper bound and the minimal
cut lower bound, respectively, for phase configuration j, j=l,...,m.
Using basically the same approach as before, and choosing as component
42

reliabilities the conditional component phase reliabilities tt,
.
in one case and the (unconditional) component reliabilities p,
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in the other, one obtains the approximations
(5.2.D ttpub = TTj=1iHJBj (*lj >.-.,vj )
and
(5 ' 2 - 2) PPLB
=
TTj-lVl (PlJ p nj );
which by the following theorem are bounds on mission reliability.
Theorem 5.3 . For t1 R as given by (5.2.1), p as given by




Proof . The phase configurations are coherent, thus hy R - - h. <
b-TTT,., j =l>''-» m j by construction, and the inequalities
(5.2.3) IT. n h. (it, . , . . . ,tt .) i T. .h,TT,. Or, ., . . . ,ir .)1












hold. Therefore p < TTpITR from (5.1.1), (5.2.1) and Theorem 5.1, and
p_,TTl < p from (5.1.2), (5.2.2) and Theorem 5.1. Q
JtJ_i.d
It is easy to see that if a different choice of component reliabi-
lities is made, i.e. if the (unconditional) component reliabilities
are used with the phase minimal path upper bounds, or the conditional
component phase reliabilities with the phase minimal cut lower bounds,




UBj <Plj --"Pnj ) " P " TT^Abj^Ij'-'"^^'
and strict inequality may hold. On the other hand, for a phased mission
with the block diagram
A3

-B- c , cz
phase I phase 2
the exact mission reliability and the approximations are, in the
established notation,




Hj=lhLBj (77lj' 7T2j )
=
^11^12^22'





so that lTj=i^JBj <Plj 'P2j ) * P s TTj^Bj^lj'^j^ and Strict
inequality holds if 0<it, .<1, k=l,2, j=l,2.
As before, cut cancellation can be performed prior to implementing
the approximations (5.2.1) and (5.2.2). The resulting approximations
corresponding to 7rpuB and ppLB are









denote the minimal path upper bound and the
minimal cut lower bound, respectively, for the simplified configuration
of phase j, j=l,...,m. Theorem 5.4 establishes that these approximations
are bounds.
Theorem 5.4
. For TrpuB^cc as
given by (5.2.5), PpLB_cc as given
by (5.2.6), and p as given by (2.3.1) or (3.3.1), PpLB_cc - P - ^pub-CC
Proof . The simplified phase configurations are coherent, thus




hy construction and the inequalities
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(5.2.7) TT ™ hTCir,.,...,* .) < IT ,h~
-<>i .....,ir .)M j=l j lj' nj m j=1UBj lj' nj
and
(5.2.8) TTj!1\Bj^lj "--^nj > * njVjO.jjM..^)
hold. Therefore p < n __ from (5.1.4), (5.2.5) and Theorem
5.2, and p 5 p from (5.1.5), (5.2.6) and Theorem 5.2. q
Bounds ir_rt_ „„ and p_ T __ are the last to be considered here,
1 UB—GC rJ-iU— C(_.
although additional ones certainly could be found. Attention is now
turned to a comparison and assessment of the bounds.
5.3 COMPARISON AND ASSESSMENT OF THE BOUNDS
The bounds presented in the previous two sections differ from
each other in several respects, and it is not obvious which of them are
suited best for a specific phased mission problem. It is therefore
necessary to compare and assess them. From an applications point of
view, the most significant criteria on which to base comparisons of
bounds are felt to be precision
,
i.e. closeness to the exact reliability,
and computational effort
,
i.e. cost of calculation. These criteria
will be addressed in turn.
For single-phase systems, in order to obtain a rough idea of how
system reliability responds to the achievement of a general, across-
the-board level of component reliability, and to get an indication of
the precision of bounds, it is often assumed that all components have
the same probability of functioning. Then system reliability is a
function of a single variable - component reliability - and can easily
be exhibited. To use a similar approach for a system performing a
phased mission, i.e. to assume that all conditional component phase
reliabilities are equal, is somewhat more questionable but may still
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provide an indication of the precision of bounds on mission reliability.
The following example demonstrates this.
Example 5.1 . Assume that in the mission of Example 1.1 all compo-
nents have the same conditional phase reliability tt in all phases,
and consequently the same unconditional reliabilities p .=tt in phase
j, j=l,2,3. Then the exact mission reliability and the bounds on
mission reliability, as a function of tt, take on the numerical values
given in Tables 5.1 and 5.2 below.
The tables show that for component reliabilities close to one,
the lower bounds approximate the exact mission reliability quite closely
whereas the same is not true for the upper bounds. This fact has been
observed frequently in single phase systems.
TT P
"FRF ^TRF-CC "pub ^PUB-CC
0.40 0.002 0.025 0.058 0.036 0.077
0.50 0.011 0.078 0.141 0.119 0.190
0.60 0.045 0.187 0.274 0.284 0.366
0.70 0.137 0.364 0.454 0.526 0.584
0.80 0.337 0.596 0.661 0.782 0.797
0.90 0.668 0.834 0.857 0.955 0.948
0.95 0.854 0.932 0.938 0.991 0.987
0.99 0.978 0.989 0.990 1.000 0.999
Table 5.1. Exact mission reliability and upper
bounds for the mission of Example 1.1,
46

TT P PPRF PPRF-CC PPLB PPLB-CC
0.40 0.002 0.0 4 64 0.0 336 0.0 5 30 0.0 4 57 39
0.50 0.011 0.001 0.004 0.000 0.001
0.60 0.045 0.009 0.021 0.003 0.010
0.70 0.137 0.055 0.090 0.030 0.061
0.80 0.337 0.217 0.277 0.172 0.236
0.90 0.668 0.590 0.633 0.566 0.615
0.95 0.854 0.826 0.842 0.820 0.838
0.99 0.978 0.976 0.977 0.976 0.977
Table 5.2. Exact mission reliability and lower
bounds for the mission of Example 1.1. o
The order among the bounds exhibited in Tables 5.1 and 5.2 is no
coincidence and does not only hold for this particular example. The
next theorem establishes some inequalities which are always valid.
Theorem 5.5 . For the bounds as given by (5.1.1), (5.1.2), (5.1.4)
(5.1.5), (5.2.1), (5.2.2), (5.2.5), and (5.2.6), and p as given by
(2.3.1) or (3.3.1), the following inequalities hold.










Proof . The proof consists of a separate demonstration for each
inequality.
(1) p 5 TT^r,^ by Theorem 5.1.
(2) PPRF_CC - P W Theorem 5.2.
(3) TipRF
< TrpuB from (5.1.1), (5.2.1), and (5.2.3).
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(4) p pLB 5 ppRF
from (5.1.2), (5.2.2), and (5.2.4).
(5) ttprf_cc S ttpub_cc
from (5.1.4), (5.2.5), and (5.2.7).
(6) PpLg.cc S PpRF^ c




from (5.1.1), (5.1.4), and (5.1.6).
(8) ppRp
< P pRjF_cc
from C4.2.4), (5.1.2), and (5.1.5).
Finally, since <j> . 5 <b
.
,
j=l,...,m, from (4.2.4) and thus
hj^g. <
^Bi' J =1 '-"»m » the inequality
nj!ihLBj (Pij --"%j ) - TTj=1\Bj (plj ,...,pnj )
holds, so that
(9) PPLB - PPLB_CC
from (5-2.2) and (5.2.6). a
No general inequalities can be established between tt and
PRF—LC
Tr._Tin , and between p and p,,^. This is not too surprising.
In the case of the two upper bounds, both cut cancellation and the use
of phase upper bounds instead of phase reliability functions increase
the apparent phase reliabilities; and in the case of the two lower
bounds, cut cancellation and the use of phase lower bounds instead of
phase reliability functions tend to balance each other. More formally,
consider first a system where no cut cancellation is possible, i.e.
J-f,. 3-1 m. ^ V^YV) f° r S°me j ' th6n *PRF-CC <1TPUB
from (5.2.3), and p <p from (5.2.4). Next, consider a system
with II =h.=tL for j=l,...,m. If cuts can be cancelled in any one
phase, i.e. if <l>7><|>. for some j, then 1TpRF_cc >7rPUB and
40
Pdt T3 f.p >P T)Dr from (4.2.4). The relative magnitudes of these four
bounds, however, may not only depend on the structure of the system
under consideration, but also on the values of the component reliabilities.
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This is the case in the system of Example 1.1 and can be seen by
comparing the values of Tr
pRF_cc ,
tt^, P pLB_cc and p pRF for
tt=0.4 and tt=0.8 in Tables 5.1 and 5.2.
The fact that it™.,, and tt™,., „„ also cannot be compared is
rUli cud—CL.
somewhat counter-intuitive and unexpected, because it causes an un-
symmetry in the string of inequalities of Theorem 5.5. However, it
can be shown that even two single-phase systems with structure func-
tions $- and (J>„, <j>-.>cf> 9 , may have minimal path upper bounds II
and Vl such that ?l <Il . An example is a one-out-of-two
system and a two-out-of-three system where all components have the
same reliability p. In that case, II . (p) >Vl „ (p) for 0<p<0.8,
and II (p) <h (p) for 0.9<p<l. The mission of Example 1.1 shows
a similar behavior, as can be seen by comparing the values of TrmTT>rUB
and if-njTo nn for tt=0.8 and tt=0.9 in Table 5.1.rU D—CL
As far as the computational effort required to calculate bounds
is concerned, only a few statements valid in general can be made. One
41
is that for any system performing a phased mission, less effort is
required to compute the m phase reliability functions separately than
to compute the reliability function of the equivalent system; another,
that phase bounds are easier to calculate then phase reliability
functions. Cut cancellation simplifies all reliability calculations,
but requires computational effort to be performed. This may be minimal
in some cases (in particular when phase minimal cut lower bounds are
used because then the minimal cuts of all phases have to be known
explicitly), but cannot be neglected totally. On the whole, however,
it is felt that the benefits of cut cancellation outweigh its costs.
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The diagram below is an attempt to summarize the previous obser-
vations. Its comparisons may not hold in all cases, but do indicate
what is usually true. The symbol < stands for "requires less com-
putational effort than."
^PUB-CC " "PUB "* ^PRF-CC < ^PRF
PPLB-CC
< PPLB * PPRF-CC "* PPRF
Figure 5.1. A comparison of the computational
effort required to calculate bounds.
5. A AN ALGORITHM FOR THE "BEST" BOUND
Trying to select the best bound from those presented in this
chapter is a difficult problem whose solution depends on the circum-
stances of each particular application and cannot be given in general.
If one is interested in a conservative rather than an optimistic
approximation, and if the system to be analyzed has components with
uniformly high conditional reliabilities in all phases, then the quali-
tative comparisons of the previous section and the numerical values
of Example 5.1 suggest that p is a good choice.
Since the above conditions are frequently encountered, and
p hence might be used more often than other bounds, an algorithm
for its computation is given below. This algorithm assumes that the
survival function F (t) = P[T >t] , t>0, is known for each component
C,
,
k=l,...,n, that each phase configuration is represented by a
block diagram or a fault tree, and that the duration of the phases and
thus the times t., j=l,...,m, are given.
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Algorithm for Computing PpLB_cc -
42
(1) For k=l,...,n and j=l,...,m, compute p from
(2) For j=l,...,m, find the minimal cut sets of phase j from
43
the block diagram or the fault tree for that phase.
(3) Perform cut cancellation according to the rule given in
Section 4.2.
(4) For j=l,...,m, denote the number of minimal cut sets
remaining in phase j by K(j), and the i-th minimal




The following example illustrates how the algorithm works.
Example 5.2 . Suppose that for the mission of Example 1.1, a
general expression for the lower bound p is wanted. Using
the algorithm described above, the following results are obtained:
(2) The minimal cut sets are
in phase 1 #{M,L}// {M,S}
in phase 2 {F} //{H,M}# #{H,T}# {M,L}
in phase 3 {F,M} {H,M} {H,T}
(3) The cut sets marked //{ }# above are cancelled.
(4) The minimal cut sets remaining are denoted by
K
1L










and the bound p Is given by
PpLB-CC " U-(1-PM1)(1-P S1)]I1-(1-PF2 )]
*[i-u-p
m2 ) Ci-pL2)]Ii-(i-PF3 ) (i-Pjq)]
*U-(i-p h3 )(i-pm3 )][i-(i-p h3 )(i-pt3 )]. D
This concludes the discussion of bounds based on reliabilities
directly. In the next chapter, a reliability transformation is pre-





6. HAZARD TRANSFORMS FOR PHASED MISSIONS
Recently, Esary and Hayne [1973] extended the scope of application
of a simple reliability calculus of Rubinstein [1961, 1965] to coherent
systems. This calculus uses an approximate hazard transform and leads
to conservative approximations to system reliability. Its potential
for use in the phased mission problem is explored here.
6.1 AN APPROXIMATE HAZARD TRANSFORM
The hazard transform of a system with reliability function
h(p.,...,p ) is defined as
HCu^,..-. ,u
n
) = -log hCp^...^) = -log h(e~ul e"Un)
,
where u = -log p, is the component hazard of component C, having
reliability p, , k=l,...,n. Knowing the hazard transform of a system
is equivalent to knowing its reliability function since
h(pr ...,Pn )
= e^V-'-'V = e-H(-log Pi- ---log Pn>.
The assumption that components perform independently is implicit in the
definition of a hazard function, just as it is in the definition of a
reliability function.
The approximate hazard transform H' considered by Esary and Hayne
can be defined by the following rules:
(1) For a system consisting of a single component C, , the




(2) For a system which is a combination of two modules (subsystems
with disjoint sets of components) having approximate hazard
transforms H' and H' , the approximate hazard transform
H' is
H' = H' + H' if the combination is series,
H' = H'H' if the combination is parallel.
So far, the rules define the approximate hazard transform only for
systems that can be formed by successive series and parallel combina-
tions of subsystems which have no components in common, i.e. for the
class of simple systems considered by Lomnicki [1973] . To extend the
definition to systems which are coherent but not necessarily simple,
a third rule is needed. This rule makes use of the fact that any
coherent system can be represented in terms of its minimal cut sets.
whose approximate hazard transforms are H' , . .
.
,H' , the
approximate hazard transform H' is
H' = H' + H^ + ...+ H<
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Esary and Hayne show that the approximate hazard transform
obtained in this way is conservative, i.e. indicates greater system
hazard (less system reliability) than the exact transform. For further
reference, this fact is noted as a theorem.
Theorem 6.1 . For a coherent system with reliability function h,
hazard transform H, and approximate hazard transform H' obtained
according to the rules above, H' > H, and consequently h 1 < h, where
h' = e . d
(3) For a coherent system with minimal cut sets K_,...,L
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6.2 APPLICATION OF THE APPROXIMATE HAZARD TRANSFORM TO THE PHASED
MISSION PROBLEM
Several approximations to the mission reliability of a multi-
phased system can be derived using the approximate hazard transform
defined in the previous section. One of them is discussed here in
detail.
Suppose that cut cancellation has already been performed in a
phased mission. Let Hi be the approximate hazard transform of the
simplified configuration of phase j, j=l,...,m, and define an approxi-
mate hazard transform for the mission, H' , by
(6.2.1) H' = Hi + H' +...+ H'.12m
Then h' given by
(6.2.2) h 1 = e
n
= e ^1 ' "2 V
is a conservative approximation to the mission reliability p, as is
proved in the following theorem.
Theorem 6.2 . For h' as given by (6.2.2) and p as given by
(2.3.1) or (3.3.1), h" 5 p.
Proof
.
Let h!=e~j, j=l,...,m. Then h'
=TT-=i h - from
(6.2.1) and (6.2.2). Since the phase configurations are coherent, then
h' 5 hT, j=l,...,m, by Theorem 6.1. Therefore,
"T-=i n - - TT-=i n~>
and the result follows from (5.1.5) and Theorem 5.2.
An algorithm for computing h' consists of the following steps,
where the notation of Section 5.4 is used:







(2) For j=l,...,m, find the minimal cut sets of phase j
from the block diagram or the fault tree for that phase.
(3) Perform cut cancellation according to the rule of Section 4.2.
(4) Compute the approximate hazard transform for the mission from
m K(j)
*'= I I TTC K
..u
j=l i=l k ji
(5) Compute the lower bound h' from
h' = e
A comparison of this algorithm with the one presented in Section
5.4 indicates that the calculations of the bounds h' and p_,T D __
require about the same amount of effort. Both are conservative, but
h' is less precise than p , as is established in Theorem
6.3 below. It is therefore questionable from an applications point of
view whether h' can replace p as the "best" lower bound for
a phased mission. However, if all components of a system are assumed
to have constant failure rates throughout each phase - as is often
done for lack of better information about the distributions of the
components' time to failures - the approximate hazard transform H'
has the attractive feature that it is a polynomial in all of the phase
durations. Thus it is well suited for parametric studies. An illustra-
tion for this is given after the assertion about the relative precision
of h' and p_.T „ has been proved.
Theorem 6.3 . For h' as given by (6.2.2), and p as
given by (5.2.6), h' 5 PpLB_cc -
Proof . It suffices to note that in the calculation of p T „ „„,
the exact reliability of each parallel subsystem corresponding to a
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minimal cut set is used, whereas in the case of h 1 , as a consequence
of Theorem 6.1, a conservative approximation to the reliability of each
such subsystem is the basis for the calculation. The result then
follows from the fact that all other steps of the computation are
equivalent.
Example 6.1 . Consider the mission of Example 1.1. Assume that
the failure rate of component k in phase j is a constant r .
,
k=F,H,L,M,S,T, j=l,2,3, and let d. be the duration of phase j,
j=l,2,3. Then from step (1) of the algorithm above, the component
hazards are
u, . = r, -d.. +. . .+ r, .d
.
,
kj kl 1 kj j'
and the following general expression for the approximate hazard
45








































































Tld l+rT2 d2+rT3d 3 ) '
Now suppose that the duration of phase 2, d„, is uncertain, and
that a sensitivity analysis on it is desired. H' as a function of d„
can be written as
(6.2.3) H '(d
2 )


































































































































For a numerical illustration, assume that phase 1 lasts 30 minutes
and phase 3 lasts 10 hours, and that the following failure rates (in
hours ) are given:
Component F H L M S T
Phase 1 0.000 0.001 0.040 0.020 0.100 0.000
Phase 2 0.020 0.003 0.010 0.006 - 0.020
Phase 3 0.010 0.002 - 0.005 - 0.020
Then
a = 0.012030,




c = 0.000258 hours .
For various durations of phase 2 (in hours) , the approximate hazard trans-
form for the mission, H' , and the lower bound on mission reliability
h f
,














10 0.271 0.763 a
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7. POSSIBLE EXTENSIONS AND REMAINING PROBLEMS
It was shown in this thesis how, under suitable assumptions, the
phased mission problem can be formulated mathematically and transformed
into an equivalent single-phase problem, and how exact mission reliabili-
ties and approximations to them can be computed. The assumptions made,
however, may not always be satisfied by realistic systems and missions
which have to be analyzed. In particular, components may not perform
46independently, failed components may be replaced, and the durations
of the phases may not be known in advance.
47Systems with interdependent components have been studied, but
so far no generally valid methods to model them seem to be available.
In certain situations an approach similar to the one described in
Chapter 3, i.e. the transformation of a system with interdependent
components into an equivalent system whose synthetic components perform
independently, may be feasible. Another approach might make use of the
fact that several theorems on which lower bounds are based remain valid





As far as a replacement of failed components is concerned, it is
felt that this feature can be incorporated into the model without
causing major problems. If replacement is instantaneous at failure,
it might simply be considered in the component's time to failure dis-
tribution; if replacement can occur only at the end of a phase, then
the equivalent system may be modified to reflect this fact.
Example 6.1 indicated how uncertainties in the duration of the
phases can be dealt with if component failure, rates are constant
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throughout the phases. Under these circumstances, and if phase
durations are assumed to be random, the mean of the approximate hazard
transform for the mission can be found, even without complete knowledge
49
of the phase durations' distributions.
As a final comment on the phased mission problem, it should be
pointed out that even if all the extensions mentioned above can be
incorporated into a model, practical use of it can only be made if all
the necessary inputs are available. These inputs, the component relia-
bilities on one hand, and the functional organization of the system in





This term is used by Barlow and Proschan [1965].
2
This definition of reliability is due to the Radio-Electronics
Television Manufacturers Association [1955], as cited in Barlow and
Proschan [1965], p. 6, and is widely accepted.
3
Roughly, a system is coherent if its "performance is not impaired
by an improvement in the performance of its components" [Esary and
Marshall 1964, p. 459]. All two-terminal networks and all systems
whose functional organization can be represented by a fault tree using
AND and OR gates only are coherent. - Barlow and Proschan [1965] use
the term "monotonic" instead, but "coherent" seems to be more widely
accepted and will be used in this thesis.
This approach was used before by Mine [1959].
Barlow and Proschan [1965], pp. 196f.
"Roughly... a device has a life if it functions continuously until
some time of failure, and remains failed thereafter." [Esary and
Marshall 1964, p. 459.]
Among these are: components perform independently - components
have exponential lives - only two states are recognized for components
and systems.
g
The method is described in Chapter 4.
9
The manual section on phased missions is based on the work of C.
Persels.
Success paths and Muth's approach are briefly discussed in Section
1.4.
Cf. the definition given above in Note 6.
12
In the military, for instance, a communication network, the power
plant of a ship, and a mine are systems which may be required to perform
phased missions.
13
Apologies are extended for this example to all firemen and all
chemical engineers.
14
Esary and Marshall [1964], Theorem 3.1, p. 461.
15
Muth [1964], p. 2.
16
Rubin [1964], p. 263.
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Expressing the life length as a random variable also permits
by the proper choice of its distribution function, taking into account
the operating conditions (the environment) which the system encounters.
18
This is one of the classic assumptions mentioned before which are
not very realistic but without which an exact reliability analysis is
currently impossible.
19
An example for a system which violates this assumption is an
HF-communication network. Here the atmospheric conditions play an
important factor in determining whether the system functions or not.
20
A block diagram is a graphical model of the functional organiza-
tion of components in a system. It provides a positive view of the
system in that it indicates the combinations of functioning components
which guarantee the functioning of the system.
21
A fault tree is also a graphical model of the functional organi-
zation of a system, but in contrast to a block diagram it provides a
negative view of the system because it indicates which combination of
failed components cause failure of the system.
22
Almost all engineering system are coherent. A ship with two
captains could be an example for a system which is not coherent.
Generally, an EXCLUSIVE OR gate in a fault tree indicates a non-coherent
system.
23
This follows immediately from the definition; cf. Esary and
Proschan [1963], p. 192.
24
Birnbaum, Esary, and Saunders [1961], pp. 66f.
25
Esary and Marshall [1964], Theorem 3.1, p. 461.
26 1
Cf. Figure 3.1. Component M , for instance, is common to all
three subsystems.
27
Such computational methods are, for instance, the inclusion-
exclusion algorithm and pivotal decomposition.
28
Cf. Fussell and Vesely [1972] and Vesely and Narum [1970] who
describe programs for the analysis of fault trees.
29
Barlow and Proschan [197_] Chapter 1, or Birnbaum, Esary, and
Saunders [1961], Theorem 2.7.7.1, p. 65.
30
Note, however, that as a result of cut cancellation the relia-
bility of each phase configuration considered by itself increases.
31
Cf. Examples 1.2 and 3.1 and the paragraphs preceding them.
32
The subscript PRF is used mnemonically to indicate that these




These are discussed, for instance, in Barlow and Proschan
[19
7
] , Chapter 2, and in Esary, Proschan, and Walkup [1967]. From
the latter paper, Theorem 2.1, Theorem 4.1, and Property (P4) are needed
in this proof.
34
Association is a special kind of positive dependence among
several random variables. Performance state indicator variables are
associated if the structure functions of any two coherent systems
built from their corresponding components are positively correlated.
35
The added subscript CC indicates that cut cancellation has
been performed.
36
Cf. the second part of the proof of Theorem 5.1.
37
A detailed discussion of these bounds and proofs are given in
Esary and Proschan [1963], Section 4, pp. 194-197.
38
The subscript PUB stands for phase upper bounds, and the sub-
script PLB for phase lower bounds.
39 i
The abbreviation 0.CP64 stands for 0.000064.
40
It is assumed here that all conditional component phase relia-
bilities are strictly positive and less than one.
41
Terms which indicate a comparison are used here in the weak
sense, i.e. "less" stands for "not more".
42
Step (1) can be omitted if a general expression for the bound
rather than a numerical value for it is needed.
43
There exist computer programs which can perform this step.
MOCUS, for instance, developed by Fussell, Henry, and Marshall [1974],
is a program that finds the minimal cut sets of a system from its
fault tree.
44
Esary and Hayne [1973], Theorem 2.5, p. 12.
45
Steps (2) and (3) of the algorithm are the same as in Example
5.2 and not repeated here.
46
Interdependence among components may be caused, for instance,
by common manufacturing processes or common operating conditions, or
because the failure of one component increases the load on its neighbor.
47
For instance by Esary and Marshall [1974]
.
48
Cf. Remark 2.4 in Esary and Hayne [1973], p. 11.
49
Equation (6.2.3) shows that for the particular mission considered
E H' (D
? )
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